http://www.afsa.org/fsj/Feb99/AreiraquiSanctionsInmoral.html
Most people recognize that civilians will, in the short term, inevitably suffer to some degree from economic sanctions. However, it is hoped that this suffering will thereby spur the population to challenge the policies of the government which led to the imposition of sanctions and perhaps even lead to the overthrow of the offending regime. Sanctions, then, while not painless, are often seen as a nonviolent alternative to military intervention as a means of applying pressure to recalcitrant regimes. In the case of Iraq, however, ongoing United Nations sanctions _ most vigorously supported by the United States _ may have actually been more destructive than war, in terms of the number of lives lost as a result.
Yet it is Iraq's poor, particularly the children, who have suffered the most. Estimates of the total number of Iraqis killed as a result of malnutrition and preventable diseases as a direct consequence of the sanctions have ranged from a quarter million to over one million, the majority of whom have been children. UNICEF estimates that at least 4,500 Iraqi children are dying every month as a result of the sanctions. Indeed, perhaps there has been no other occasion during peacetime when so many people have been condemned to starvation and death from prevent-able diseases due to political decisions made overseas.
Part of the ineffectiveness of the sanctions comes from the nature of Saddam Hussein's regime. It is more than simply another authoritarian Middle Eastern government; indeed, next to North Korea, it is the most totalitarian regime on the planet. Therefore, the ability of the population to organize effectively against the regime or its policies, particularly under dire economic conditions created by the sanctions, is severely limited. Indeed, this is why virtually every recognized Iraqi opposition group has come out against the sanctions regime. The potential political effectiveness of sanctions as well as their morality can be judged in part by the willingness of the opposition to have its people endure the hardships imposed. A counter-example would be the case of South Africa, where the black majority had long lobbied for a tough stance by the international community against the apartheid regime.
The morality of a particular foreign
policy is tempered by its results. If human suffering from economic
sanctions can advance a policy goal that would lead to less suffering
in the long term, one could make the case that it was morally
justified. Indeed, in an interview on 60 Minutes
regarding the
devastating impact sanctions were having on the children of Iraq,
Albright declared that we think the price is worth it.
We should begin a systematic search for alternatives to economic
sanctions as they are currently applied. Sometimes it seems as though
sanctions have become virtually the only tool in our foreign policy
kit. When I see a list of potential target countries, I am reminded of
the old saying: When your only tool is a hammer, every problem
starts to look like a nail.
In thinking about the effectiveness of
sanctions in general, I am inclined to wonder if we are hitting our
thumbs more often—and harder—than the nail.
I do not question the goals of economic sanctions. Sanctions are often used in the fight against some of the most challenging problems in the world today—human rights abuse, weapons proliferation, drug trafficking, and terrorism. And I recognize that there are times when the United States must stand alone for what we believe is right. In those cases, U.S. companies will always stand with our government.
The questions and arguments about sanctions that consume the most time and energy usually center on whether they work. The answer is a matter of judgment, which depends critically on how one defines their purpose. That is, economic sanctions must be judged by their success in achieving specific stated objectives. That is not an easy task, however, because the objectives can be multiple, muddled, or variable.
The empirical record of desired policy changes that correlate with the imposition of economic sanctions is short. In the vast majority of cases, no change in policy is achieved.
A second reason economic sanctions rarely cause policy changes or inflict meaningful punishment is that in today's global economy they rarely have a significant economic impact. Actions by one government to deny economic goods or services to another country generally do not succeed because of the availability of goods or substitute goods from other source countries.
The indiscriminate distribution of the economic costs of sanctions is another factor that limits their effectiveness. In target countries any economic costs inflicted may fall on the elements of the population that the sanctions are designed to support; that is the case in South Africa where diminished U.S. business presence brings hardships and loss of economic opportunity to former black employees and other blacks who benefited from programs sponsored by those companies
In both cases sanctions are imposed in pursuit of a national policy and have some properties of a public good (a good provided by government expenditure that is collectively consumed) similar to national defense. The chief difference is that, unlike most public goods, the government does not pay directly for the sanctions, and the great attraction for policymakers is the appearance of a decisive response that is often without direct short-term costs to them or to the public at large. Yet costs do exist, and they are usually borne disproportionately by particular sectors or businesses.
It has been aptly said that a state's foreign policy is an extension of its domestic policy. Each state has two paramount concerns. First, the preservation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and second, the advancement of the social and economic welfare of its people. By extension, therefore, its foreign policy must have as its primary aim the creation of an external environment that is conducive to achieving these goals.