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Date: Mon, 23 Jan 1995 13:58:36 -0500
From: bohdan@panix.com (Bohdan Peter Rekshynskyj)
Subject: Ukrainian Republican Party -> [NEWS] ECONOMY, 23 january 1995,
ANALYSIS AND COMMENTS (in English)
To: ukes-news@soma.crl.mcmaster.ca
Reply-to: FSU@Sovset.ORG
Message-id: <ab49abdb0e021004c446@[166.84.249.95]>
Ukraine again signs ‘zero variant,’ but is it the final
decision?
By Victor Tkachuk, Ukrainian Republican Party, 23 January 1995
The so-called "zero variant" of distribution of assets and
liabilities of the former USSR, recently signed by the Ukrainian
premier in Moscow, will soon be considered by the Ukrainian
parliament.
SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT
There were a lot of rumors about signing of the "zero
variant". The premier Masol's statement "Today nobody owes
us anything and we do not owe anything to anybody" caused a
real shock among the politicians having the influential factions in
the parliament. According to the zero variant agreement,
Ukraine refuses to have its part in the USSR assets and transfers
them to Russia while the latter will pay the Ukraine's part of the
USSR debt. On the second day of signing the agreement, a
parliamentarian from the faction "Reforms" confidentially told
journalists that President Kuchma had instructed Premier Masol
to sign the zero variant only together with other two
documents - on restructuring of the Ukraine's debt to Russia
and on providing Ukraine with the premises in 36 USSR
embassies abroad. Instead, Mr Masol signed only the zero
variant agreement. A week later, security council secretary
V.Horbulyn confirmed that information and accused the premier
of the lack of principled approach. Premier's assistant Melnichuk
stated that the premier had received clear instructions from the
president to sign just the zero variant. I.Yukhnovsky, leader of
the faction "Statehood", is sure that such clear instructions had
really been made saying that in 1993, when Kuchma was the
premier, he also supported said variant.
SOME HISTORY.
In the spring of 1992 Ukraine several times agreed to
sign the zero variant. That happened during the visit of the
Ukrainian delegation with Vice-Premier Pynzenyk at the head to
Moscow. The protocol on intentions signed by him specified
that Ukraine refused to have its part of USSR assets while the
Ukrainian part of the USSR liabilities was included into Ukraine's
debt to Russia. It was the then Finance Minister Pyatachenko
that pursued Pynzenyk not to sign the zero variant agreement
in such formulation. After that, said protocol was disavowed by
the Ukrainian foreign ministry. In 1993, the then Vice-Minister
Yukhnovsky conducted the talks to that end and he was the
first to propose to first divide the USSR assets and then
liabilities.
Division of the USSR assets and liabilities was like the
sword of Damocles hanging over the relations between Ukraine
and Russia since all other ex-Soviet republics gave their parts to
Moscow. Another round of games around this issue started in
the fall of 1994. In September, the government sources
informed about the request of the Ukrainian administration to
the Paris club of creditors to postpone payment of the USSR
debt by Russia and the interest amounting to 800 mln. dollars.
The first postponement was also granted with active
participation of Ukraine when, on March 26, 1993 the then
Premier Kuchma sent similar request to the Paris club of
creditors saying that 18 countries-creditors of the former USST
did not have a single claim against Ukraine until the debt
payment issue is settled by Russia and Ukraine. That helped
Russia to conduct the talks on behalf of all states-successors of
the former USSR and to get the postponement for paying the
debt for 1993 and 1994.
USSR ASSETS
They include:
- financial assets (debts of other states to the Soviet
Union);
- fixed assets (property of joint ventures, missions of the
Soviet companies, banks and embassies abroad).
- gold, diamond and copper stock whose value is still
unknown in Ukraine. In the beginning of 1993, the Russian
government provided such information at the request of Vice-
Premier Yukhnovsky but he does not regard it as fully authentic.
In particular, he remembers that according to the Russian list
there are 16 objects of the former USSR in Austria while, after
his official request, the Austrian government informed that the
number of objects was 48. According to Mr Yukhnovsky, Russia
had already sold a part of property assets, so now it is
impossible to prove that the property for which Moscow
received money belongs to the USSR assets.
Russia sells both property and financial assets. According
to T.Yakheeva, MP and economist, Russia sells the debts of
other countries to the USSR at the price lower than the nominal
one. For instance, according to her, the 90 mln. USD debt of
Madagascar was sold for 45 mln. USD. After collapse of the
USSR, some countries already paid their debt to Russia but
Ukraine received nothing. She says that by January 1, 1991
financial assets of the USSR had two times exceeded its
liabilities. Nobody knows about the amount of such assets
today.
USSR LIABILITIES (debts).
According to Mr Yukhnovsky, the USSR made most
debts during the rule of Gorbachov. The biggest credits were
given to the USSR in the second half of 1991 after the Ukrainian
government adopted the Act on Independence on August 24,
1991. Ukraine received just 15 million USD of the credit amount.
From that time, it was Russia that paid the USSR debt with the
aid of Ukraine. Despite said debt payment postponements
granted by the Paris club, at the end of 1994 Russia again
found itself in a rather difficult position. The Russian government
is not so successful in its talks with the London club of creditors
that provided a commercial credit to Russia.
In July, 1993, the Russian delegation with Vice-Premier
Shokhin at the head managed to receive the postponement of
payment of the London club's commercial debt (about 30 bln.
dollars) but the document to that end was never signed. The
situation changed for the better in March, 1994 when the IMF
gave 3 bln. $ to Russia to set up the stabilization fund. Then
followed the standby credit to the tune of 4 bln. $.
However, in October, the Deutsche bank, a major force
in the London club, issued the statement on different
approaches of the parties to the debt problem resulting from
uncertain legal status of ex-Soviet republics. In fact, the London
club did not recognize the Russia's right to conduct the talks on
behalf of all successors of the USSR.
It seems that the London club hesitated as a result of
political chaos in Russia last fall when Yeltsin shot at his
parliament and Zhirinovsky's party gained big success at the
parliamentary elections. At that time, many analysts criticized
the risk taken by the IMF in giving credits to Russia.
In the last few months, the market value of the USSR
liabilities at the securities market varied depending on political
situation in Russia. In December, 1993 the proposal price was
55 while by March 21, 1994 it decreased down to 33. The
lowest price of foreign economic bank liabilities was 28.
CONCLUSIONS
The right of Russia to conduct talks with creditors and to
handle the USSR assets directly depends on signing the zero
variant agreement. On the other hand, the Ukrainian debt for oil
and gas supplies from Turkmenistan and Russia forces Kyiv to
make concessions in this field. According to V.Melnichuk,
situation changed for the worse after the talks in Turkmenistan
where Economics Minister R.Shpek promised that Ukraine would
pay part of its debt to Turkmenistan using the IMF credit
amounting to 350 mln. $. Several days after that, Russia also
wanted to have part of the credit money threatening to cut the
gas supplies in the middle of winter. Such policy is easy to
explain by the war in Chechnya that absorbs a big part of the
Russian state budget. So it seems that Premier Masol had
nothing to do but to sign the zero variant.
However, this fact does not mean that the Ukrainian
parliament will ratify the agreement. Ukraine sure wants to
delay the settlement of this issue. Most centrist leaders in the
parliament do not think that Ukraine will receive a part of the
USSR assets but they are going to use the assets and liabilities
factor in political games with Russia. The same holds for the
policy of the president's team. Still, the president may use the
zero variant in order to remove Mr Masol from his post. The
real progress in this field can appear only after signing the
Russian-Ukrainian cooperation and friendship treaty. Ukraine can
also use the zero variant to exert pressure on Russia in order to
amend some formulations of the treaty in its favor. The
ratification also depends on the approval of the state budget
for 1995.
Information-press Service URP-Inform of the Ukrainian Republican Party.
Director: Rostyslav Onyshchak.
Ukraine, Kyyiv,
27 Prorizna str.,
tel.: + 7 (044)228-75-96,
FAX: + 7 (044)228-04-09,
E-mail: rst@urp.kiev.ua
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