Arms sales to Latin America

By Thomas Cardamone, Council for a Livable World, 18 December 1997

On August 1, 1997, the Clinton administration announced that the U.S. would end a successful 20-year moratorium on the sale of advanced military equipment to Latin American states. This marked the culmination of a protracted interagency debate that highlighted Defense and State Departments' differing opinions on the issue. Despite opposition by a number of Latin American leaders and warnings from President Clintons's first Secretary of State Warren Christopher in August 1996 congressional testimony that the U.S. should show great restraint, the White House abandoned the moratorium, creating the possibility for billions of dollars in high-tech arms sales to the region.

An early test of the new policy is a U.S. offer to sell jet fighters to the Chilean military, whose army chief is former dictator General Agusto Pinochet. Ironically, Pinochets's bloody 1973 coup and human rights violations during his dictatorship (1973-90) were the reasons the Carter administration originally imposed the high-tech arms sale moratorium.

In May 1977, based on concerns about human rights abuses by Latin Americas's many dictatorships, President Jimmy Carter issued Presidential Decision Directive 13, banning sales of US attack jets and other high-tech items. Except for a 1982 transfer of 24 F-16 jets to Venezuela in response to Cubas's acquisition of MiG-28 fighters from the Soviet Union, the policy held for two decades. Other jet suppliers such as France and Sweden followed the U.S. lead and refrained from selling the most sophisticated equipment. As a result, Latin America now has one of the worlds's lowest levels of military technology.

Despite Washingtons's moratorium on the sale of advanced weaponry, the U.S. is still the largest supplier of military equipment to Latin America. According to a 1997 Congressional Research Service study, from 1993-96 the U.S. supplied over 25% of all arms shipped to the regionythree times more than any other nation. Moreover, a 1997 U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency report notes that from 1984 to 1995, the U.S. led all countries in deliveries (through both sales and military aid) of military aircraft to the region.

The 1997 White House decision signaled the successful conclusion of a quiet but tenacious lobbying effort by American military contractors, the Pentagon, and 116 senators and congressmen who had received aerospace industry PAC funds in the 1996 election. This lobbying effort was itself prompted by the Chilean militarys's decision, first announced in 1994, to purchase 24 advanced combat aircraft, estimated to be worth $1 billion. The contractors's primary rationale for reversing U.S. policyythe possibility of lucrative new contracts in a post cold war era when both domestic and foreign orders for combat equipment have plummetedywas especially persuasive to the White House. The Clinton administration has made arms exports an important component of its economic globalization strategy, and Washington assesses the economic impact on US weapons makers when contemplating export decisions. The lure of the Chilean contract, together with intense industry lobbying, convinced the White House to lift the moratorium, even though Chile faces no significant security threat.

Problems with U.S. Arms Sales Policy

Despite the implication by the lengthy inter-agency review process that the move is an exception to normal U.S. foreign policy, the Clinton administrations's decision to end the moratorium on sales of advanced weapons to Latin America is consistent with its conventional arms export strategy. A 1995 White House fact sheet on the Clinton administrations's new Conventional Arms Transfer Policy described arms sales as a legitimate instrument of U.S. foreign policy, adding that a criterion for approval is the impact the decision will have on U.S. industry. Under the combined weight of Chiles's effort to acquire new jets, U.S. arms exporterss' intense lobbying, and millions of dollars in political donations, the administrations's decision was easily forecast. Ironically, though, there was no firm deal with Chile, whose air force is also considering purchasing the jets from France or Sweden.

Historically, the U.S. has justified arms exports as vital to bolstering the security of its allies around the globe. With no cross-border security imperative in South America, however, the U.S. arms industry was successful in shifting the debate to focus on economic gains. American weapons makers argued that if they did not sell Chile the jets, their European competitors would. Statements by administration officials underscored the point that regional security was not the only issue discussed during the policy review process. In early April 1997, after a preliminary move to allow U.S. firms to supply technical data to potential Latin American arms buyers, State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns noted that the decision was reached tso that our companies. . . would not be at a disadvantage in the competition.

Transfers of advanced equipment are likely to adversely affect both the external and internal security of the countries in the region. Although a massive arms build-up reminiscent of the Middle East after the Gulf War is improbable in cash-strapped Latin America, countries are likely to begin acquiring expensive arms with little military utility. South American nations now enjoy relative military parity, but Chiles's purchase of F-16s will represent a substantial technological leap in the region, forcing other states to bolster their defenses. This is certain to create, in turn, a call for foreign military financing and increased military assistance from the United States.

Given the fragility of both democratic institutions and economic stability in Latin America, these countries need to be investing their limited resources in production for local and export markets, as well as in physical infrastructure and social services such as health care and education. A 1996 World Bank report found, for instance, that Latin America needs to spend up to $1 billion per week to maintain and upgrade crumbling or non-existent communication, water, and transportation systems.

Advanced attack jets cannot address the real security threats currently facing Latin America, such as extreme economic inequality, rampant drug-trafficking, and nagging guerrilla movements. The large investment needed to address these infrastructure, social service, and security challenges will be impossible if a new round of military acquisitions is initiated.

Further, the decision to abandon the current policy of arms sales restraint may actually undermine the Clinton administrations's longer term goals. The presidents's domestic policy emphasizes exports to build the U.S. economy and create job growth. At the same time, his stated foreign policy objectives are to promote democracy, regional stability, and strong economies in order to provide viable markets for U.S. goods. Though lifting the moratorium may bring a short-term boost in weapons exports, in the long term it will undermine foreign policy objectives by shifting investment capital away from domestic development and into military spending. This shift will likely result in lost export opportunities for non-military American industries and a downturn in export-related jobs. In sum, the Clinton administrations's decision to lift the high-tech weapons moratorium and extend MNNA status to Argentina is militarily and politically risky and economically short-sighted.

Toward a New Arms Sales Policy

Ideally, the U.S. should reimpose its moratorium on all advanced weaponry, but this is unlikely. There are, however, steps the Clinton administration can take prior to authorizing sales of combat jets or other advanced equipment to Latin American countries.

First, the U.S. should embrace and promote a recommendation put forth in April 1997 by current and former Latin American heads of state for a two-year moratorium on the purchase and sale of attack jets to the region. The goal of the proposed moratorium is to provide time for high-level representatives of all states to meet and discuss their security concerns and formulate a plan to provide for their defense without purchasing expensive combat aircraft.

Twenty-seven current heads of state in the hemisphere, including those of Colombia, Mexico, and Canada, now support such a cooling-off period to give them time to address regional security threats and needs. While some of Latin Americas's largest nations (including Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela) have not yet endorsed the plan, there is increasing interest in a new framework to ensure regional stability. Indeed, during a visit to Washington in September 1997, Chilean Foreign Minister Jos Miguel Insulza noted that there is tno hemispheric security [and] there hasns't been a security policy since the cold war.v

Second, the Clinton Administration should propose a regional convention calling for numerical and technological limits on military hardware. The resulting treaty should be modeled on the Conventional Forces in Europe Treatyywith some modifications. For instance, the number of weapons categories should be expanded from the five used in the European compact (tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters) to include warships and missiles, which are part of the UN Register on Conventional Arms. Further, the treaty should put limits on technology to prohibit ground-attack or night-attack capability for jets, thereby reducing the risk of a fatal miscalculation in times of high tension. Provisions such as these would build military security in the region by providing for a strong defensive force while decreasing the probability of an offensive military action.

Third, the U.S. should foster additional discussions on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM). These measures could include requiring a defensive positioning of military forces and the creation of crisis management teams to aid in the peaceful resolution of disputes. Such actions would allow nations in the region to resolve disagreements and preempt military crises.

Given the regions's long-held distrust of U.S. intentions, the Clinton administration must walk a fine line in promoting these measures. The approaches discussed here must be pursued as a pragmatic attempt to ensure national security, enhance regional stability, bolster democratic governments, promote civilian control of the military, and foster economic development. Moratoriums on high-tech military acquisitions and transfers of excess defense articles are crucial components of a comprehensive approach toward these goals. Further, the U.S. must embrace the notion promoted by the 1996 Presidential Advisory Board on Arms Proliferation Policy stating that an unwise arms sale is still unwise no matter how many jobs are created. Without a serious attempt at arms restraint, further progress is at risk.

Sources for More Information

Arms Control Association
Email: armscontrol@igc.apc.org

Arms Sales Monitoring Project
Federation of American Scientists
Email: llumpe@fas.org

British American Security Information Council
Email: basicusa@igc.apc.org

Center for Defense Information
Email: disenberg@cdi.org

Center for International Policy
Email: cip@igc.apc.org
Website: http://www.us.net/cip/index.htm

Council for a Livable World Education Fund
Conventional Arms Transfers Project
Email: cardamone@clw.org
Website: http://www.clw.org/pub/clw/cat/catmain.html

Demilitarization for Democracy
Email: pdd@clark.net

Latin American Working Group
Email: lawg@igc.apc.org
Website: http://www.igc.apc.org/lawg/

The Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress
Email: funpaz@sol.racsa.co.cr
Website: http://www.arias.or.cr/

World Policy Institute
New School for Social Research
Email: hartung@newschool.edu

The Carter Center Latin American Program
Website: http://www.emory.edu/CARTER_CENTER/demo.htm#lacp