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Is Majimbo Federalism? Constitutional Debate in a Tribal
Shark-Tank
By Peter Kagwanja and Willy Mutunga, The Nation
(Nairobi), 20 May 2001
The majimbo debate is finally coming home to roost. This occurs
against the backdrop of passage of the Constitution of Kenya Review
(Amendment) Bill that legalized part of the merger agreements between
the Ufungamano initiative and the [Yash] Ghai Commission on May 8,
2001. What has never become succinctly clear is whether Majimboism-a
Swahili word which means "administrative units" or
"regions"-is the same as federalism.
A close study of Kenya's history reveals that all constitutional
negotiations have been accompanied by clamour for majimboism. It was
the central theme of the Lancaster House Constitutional Conference in
1962, ahead of Kenya's independence, and has jinxed the constitutional
reform process in the multi-party era. While its proponents are
convinced that majimboism is federalism, its critics contend that the
system is as far from the known theory and practice of federalism as
the earth is from the heavens. This reveals a serious gap in the
knowledge of a system that has stalked our political debates for
almost four decades.
The Majimbo debate has been kicked off by two senior cabinet
ministers: The Ministers in the office of the President, Shariff
Nassir and William Ole Ntimama. In a KTN call-in session, Third
Opinion (10/05/01), Nassir, called for the return to majimbo "to
ensure equitable distribution of resources" after Moi's exit from
power. In a paper "The Place of Local Government in a Unitary or
Federal Government, Minister Ole Ntimama Minister invoked majimboism
to hold back what he evocatively dubbed "majoritarian
avalanche."
The paper was presented at a low-key conference on Federalism: Schools
of Majimboism, organised by the Association for Local Government
Authorities in Kenya (ALGAK) and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in Nairobi.
In addition, a Nairobi-based pro-majimbo lobby group, "Chama Cha
Mwangaza na Majimbo (CCM)" (the Majimbo Party), has called for the
implementation of the majimbo constitution of the 1963-64 period. The
lobby charges that the constitution was never given a chance before it
was eventually abrogated and thrown out unfairly.
Not all Kenyans, however, are as nostalgic of the brief hiatus of
majimboism in 1960s as the CCM lobby. The late Peter Habenga Okondo,
KADU legislator in the turbulent sixties, dismissed the majimbo
constitution as "a clumsy compromise between the federal
Westminster model and the unitary English system."
Andrew Morton, in his highly saccharine biography of President Daniel
arap Moi (Moi: The Making of an African Statesman 1998) is all praises
for the majimbo system. He lauds it as "a system of checks and
balances designed to safeguard the integrity of small tribes which
were in danger of being overwhelmed by larger tribes, particularly the
Kikuyu" (1998: 108).
What kind of constitution was majimbo and why did it fade so quickly
like the morning mist in a sunny day?
Political thinkers and legal experts argue that the 1963 majimbo
experiment was a hastily conceived, clumsy and badly thought out
variant of federalism. In a recent paper, The Majimboist Movement:
Devolution and the Protection of Minority Rights in Multiethnic Kenya
(2000:13), Drew Jackson cogently argues that: "The product of
hasty negotiations between centrist and federalist forces in the
looming face of self-rule, the Majimbo
Constitution fell short of creating a truly federalist state comprised
of multiple sub-state sovereigns."
In his powerful article Independence and Safeguards in Kenya published
in a 1967 issue of the then widely read East African Law Journal,
Professor Yash Ghai observed that: "[T]here is little evidence of
clear or coherent thought behind [the majimbo] plans." The effect
is that this saddled the nascent country with a ramshackle of a
quasi-federal constitution that was never given serious thought. Ghai
and McAuslan tell us that "The regional governments -were clumsy
and unwieldy, there was a wide dispersion of authority, and no clear
lines of responsibility."
In the end, the majimbo experiment neither pleased its proponents in
KADU nor did it win its opponents in KANU. The KADU President, Ronald
Ngala, scoffed at it as a "breach of faith (Sunday Times,
November, 1963). The brilliant KANU Secretary General, and then
Minister for Constitutional Affairs, Tom Mboya, taunted it as "an
experiment-that -[was full of] unworkable and unfair provisions (East
African Standard, May 15, 1963).
In his book, Not Yet Uhuru, Jaramogi Odinga observed that "the
[majimbo] constitution was based on artificially engendered fears, for
it is obvious that the European settlers and the British Government
helped KADU and accorded it an importance out of proportion to its
popular support."
The system was not only expensive in terms of money and personnel, but
also prevented the growth of nationhood and retarded economic
development. It was "too legalistic and cumbersome, literally
requiring a battery of legal experts and clerks at the Centre and
Regions to interpret the dos and the don'ts hidden in the myriad
legally worded clauses if it was ever to work, writes Odinga.
The failure of majimbo is attributed to the high-handedness and
opposition by Kenyatta's Kikuyu-dominated oligarchy. While most of
former KADU leaders seized and consolidated the reigns of power after
Kenyatta, in the entire 1978-1990 period, not a single constitutional
amendment to re-introduce majimboism reached the floor of
parliament. Asked why this was the case in the recent conference on
Majimboism, Honourable William Ole Ntimama, a senior majimbo
proponent, simply quipped: "Power is sweet."
Is Majimbo the same as federalism as practised in Germany, the United
States, Canada, Australia, Switzerland, India and Nigeria? As a system
of devolving state power horizontally, federalism is viewed as
accommodating and inclusive of diverse cultures and identities. It,
therefore, suits large countries or those with competing racial or
religious identity problems and is widely prescribed for ethnically
divided societies in Africa.
Federalism's greatest strength is that it provides an ideal local
nursery where skills and leadership are tried out before being
transplanted to the national level. It is said Bill Clinton was
earmarked as a national leader after his economic miracle in the tiny
Arkansas at a time when America needed an able economic reformer; and
George W. Bush, it is said, because of his "compassionate
conservatism," strong moral leadership and great skills in forging
unity of diverse cultural and racial groups and interests in
Texas. You may not believe this but most Americans do.
Federalism promotes localism, ethnic and racial xenophobia and
undermines the sense of nationhood. Unsurprising the United States and
Nigeria are living survivors of debilitating separatist wars between
their regions; India, despite its federal miracle still bleeds from
secessionist movements. The introduction of ethnic-based
'quasi-regionalism' in post-Mengistu Ethiopia has fuelled the conflict
over the proposed Oromia state by members of the Oromo ethnic
population.
Majimboism in the early 1960s had let off the lid of secessionist
movements, particularly by Kenyan Somalis in North Eastern Province
and the clamour for an autonomous "Mwambao" on the
Coast. There is no guarantee that this time around, majimboism will
not trigger ethnic recidivism and separatist movements, especially in
North Eastern, Coast and Eastern province where the Oromo population
may lean towards the movement for an Oromia state.
Federalism's main weakness is that it is a very expensive system that
duplicates services and office holders at the regional and federal
levels. It lacks uniform policies on such issues of national concern
as laws regulating marriages, divorce, abortions, liquor, voting
rights and public education. Rather than ensuring economic equity, as
many proponents of majimboism assume, it sets those regions, states or
cantons with a weak market-base, capital, and resources down the
spiral of economic decline. It subjects local governments to double
subordination-by the central and regional governments-and the citizens
to triple taxation. At a time when the country's economy is on its
knees, the feasibility of a well-financed transition is highly
doubtful.
The pro-majimbo crowd is a coat of many colours knit together by the
common fear of the effects of liberal democracy. Thus majimboism is
conceived as an antidote to the excesses of liberal democracy, as a
system that gives undue political muscle to numerically larger ethnic
groups and threatened ethnic minorities with perpetual exclusion from
power. Others have drawn out their swords against the unitary state,
disowning it as a relic of colonial autocracy that privileged ethnic
majorities and trampled on the cultural, social and economic rights of
ethnic minorities.
Majimboism has its sinister ring and a shade of blood. In many a
Kenyan mind, it is twined with what both national and international
human rights watchdogs have unmasked as politically-sponsored ethnic
cleansing, indeed genocide, in the Rift Valley, Western, Nyanza and
Coast provinces. Politically-inspired violence killed and displaced
thousands of Kenyans from their homes, destroyed property, brought
local economies to their knee, made children destitute and assaulted
citizenship and nationhood. Critics argue that majimboism is a prized
arrow in the quiver of the ruling elite to secure its place in the sun
in the face of mounting local and international pressure for political
change and economic transparency.
The unitary system, arguably, represented the Cold War reality when
Western governments and donors backed such "Strongmen and Big
Men" like Mobutu, Kenyatta, Banda, Haile Selassie and Siad Barre,
to mention a few, lock stock and barrel. They gave a pride of place to
"Strongmen and Big Men" and unitary states whether of the
military or civilian types as the only guarantee of "order amid
chaos" and bulwark against communist take-over. Indeed, fear of
mobs swarming the streets or of rag-tag gun-totting kid soldiers or
ethnic warriors stalking and terrorising the countryside has forced
donors to take a cautious, almost propitiatory stance on neo-tyranny.
Hence, the resurgence of the federal idea is viewed as a legitimate
child of globalisation. It has at once promoted global integration,
which is captured by the metaphor of a 'global village', and fuelled
tribal and racial sensibilities.
The more refined defence of majimboism is pegged on two body of
theories: 1) The classical idea that the diffusion of power prevents
tyranny; 2) Each ethnic group is entitled to autonomy. The late Peter
Habenga Okondo, in a 390-page book, A Commentary on the Constitution
of Kenya, cried out for the establishment of "The Federal
Republics of Kenya" with "Tribal States" as its
building-blocks.
Dismissing the prevailing constitutional order as an artificial
creation of British colonial authorities, Okondo hailed tribal states
as the anchors of true nationalism and the best guarantee for national
unity. He exhorted Kenyans and, indeed, all Africans to return to
their tribal hearth because they have a "natural allegiance to
tribe" and can only feel secure and at home in autonomous ethnic
states. Okondo's twenty-first century tribal category that has
remained primordial, pure and static since Adam was banished from his
'tribal' homeland of Eden would, no doubt, stir colonial
anthropologists in their graves!
Okondo skates on thin ice when he likens his version of federalism to
the states in the United States of America. He argues rather
spuriously that the American's dual allegiance to their home states
first and only second to the federal government, has strengthened the
United States and will make Kenya stronger. This argument flies in the
face of the fact that American States are not based on homogenous
ethnic or racial groups; in fact,
American states are multicultural and multiracial and movements to the
contrary are actively resisted.
On the other side of the majimbo pendulum is the call for a
multiethnic federal system based on ethnic co-operation rather than
exclusion. The spearhead of the idea of multiethnic regional states is
the Coast-based Shirikisho Party of Kenya (SPK). This comes in the
aftermath of the bloody ethnic cleansing of Wabara or Wakirienge (as
the up-country people are collectively called at the Coast) in 1997.
"Federalism is the devolution of power to the people," said
Mwagomba Mwapeu, SPK's candidate for Matuga constituency during the
1997 elections, "not discrimination against people because of
their tribes or race."
Missing in these articulations of Majimbo is the place of the
descendants of the indomitable Jeevanjee, Makhan Singh, Pio Gama Pinto
or of Kamlesh Patni and his ilk. So is that of the posterity of Lord
Delamere, Louis and Mary Leaky.
Indeed, In publication, The Federalist: The Voice of Reason,
Honourable Shariff Nasir talks of "us who come from the smaller
tribes," thus obscuring the place of Kenyans of Arab descent in
this tribal constellation (1999:2).
The clamour for majimboism comes at a time when Kenya is spearheading
a closer union with Uganda and Tanzania reminiscent of the defunct
East African federation and when the African continent is transforming
itself into a kind of federal union, along the lines of the European
Union. This challenges the wisdom of shifting to a federal structure
internally.
Unitary and federal systems alike are as old as the hills. There is
nothing untoward in Kenya adopting German-style federalism. The
question is whether a federal system will save Kenyan from the
problems of governance, accountability and corruption that have
bedevilled the unitary state. Does Kenya really need a brand new
system? Or shouldn't it rather transform the culture of politics upon
which poor governance, lack of accountability, corruption and impunity
are embedded?
Be that as it may, adhering to a predatory ethnic logic will
irretrievably torpedo nationhood and citizenship rights. Luckily for
Kenya ALGAK seems to understand this particular point. An in-depth
analysis of the ALGAK position on the issues raised in this
think-piece suggests that what the association calls for is a
decentralized and democratized central government, strong institutions
and independent and autonomous local governments.
The smallest unit of legislative and executive power is a viable
district which protects its community and minorities within it. A
democratic nexus between these districts and the central government is
established and guaranteed through a second chamber that also protects
the communities and minorities at the centre.
There are no other layers of governance, such as federalism,
provincial administration and the ministry of local government,
vitiating the autonomy, resources and the protection of local
governments. The second chamber, the chamber of ethnic communities if
you want to call it so, resists negative ethnicity and the violation
of minority rights. ALGAK has put these proposals for the
consideration of those who want to save the Motherland.
Dr. Willy Mutunga is the Executive Director of the Kenya Human Rights
Commission. Mr. Kagwanja, a doctoral candidate, is a Programme
Associate at the Commission.
Copyright 2001 The Nation. Distributed by AllAfrica Global Media
(allAfrica.com).
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