Drugs provide a pretext to renege on surrendering the Panama Canal
For Panama, the end of the millennium should be a time of celebration. After all, when Old Glory slides down the Panama Canal Commission flagpole for the last time at noon on December 31, the US will complete the most significant territorial concession in its history—the surrender of 430,000 acres of prime real estate straddling the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.
Finally gone will be 11,000 US armed forces personnel based at the headquarters of the US Southern Command. This will make it the first time since the 1800s that the US doesn't have a military presence on the Panamanian isthmus.
Panama's move to assume control of the canal will be handled under the leadership of the country's first female president, Mireya Moscoso, whose election this May was the third orderly contest in recent years. The voting was apparently free of corruption, a development that runs counter to Panama's long history of military coups and electoral fraud, auguring well for the future of the country.
Yet, the party may have to be postponed. Disturbing recent
developments indicate that the country will face a continued challenge
to its sovereignty. Using its relentless pursuit of a war on
drugs
as justification, the US is working hard to retain its
imperial role in the Caribbean and Latin America. Ironically, ceding
the canal to Panama may actually lead to a more dominant US position
in the region, a scenario that concerns not only Panama but many other
Latin American countries as well.
With the transfer of Howard Air Force Base to Panama in May 1999, the
US complained that it lost a vital base for its anti-drug surveillance
aircraft. Even under ideal circumstances, it warned, regaining the
surveillance capacity it had will take at least two or three years. In
a letter to US Defense Secretary William S. Cohen dated May 20,
Republican congressmen John L. Mica of Florida, Benjamin A. Gilman of
New York, Indiana's Mark Edward Souder, and Georgia's Robert
J. Barr described the loss
of Howard as one of the worse
disasters in US counterdrug history.
Failed negotiations
with Panama endanger the US War on Drugs,
the letter charged. Basically, the US claims—and Panama
denies—that Moscoso's predecessor, Ernesto Perez Balladores,
originally agreed to extend the US presence in Panama, but backed out
in September 1998.
What the letter didn't say was that the US was already pressuring
Panama to sign a 12-year agreement, a deal
that Panama was wary
of accepting, given its historical relationship with the US. In the
past, despite the economic benefits that the canal offered Panama
under US hegemony, many Panamanians looked at the US military presence
as an affront to their sovereignty. Their leaders have long warned
that for the US to remain indefinitely would rupture bilateral ties,
and even threaten the canal's security.
Former President Endara once told the press, We have a saying here
that Panama has actually five borders. There is Costa Rica to the
west, the Caribbean to the north, Colombia to the east, the Pacific to
the south, and the United States right through our middle.
With Panama standing its ground, the Clinton administration began to pressure several other counties in the region to allow the stationing of aircraft. Early this year, the US managed to negotiate short-term agreements with the Netherlands to station aircraft in the Dutch Caribbean protectorates of Aruba and Curacao. It's also seeking an agreement with Costa Rica. The opening of centers in Aruba and Curacao will allow the US to continue about 65 percent of the surveillance missions flown out of Howard in 1998.
But the US has run into opposition. A deal that will allow US military personnel on Ecuador's soil at an airbase in Manta has angered Ecuador's Congress, which must approve international treaties but wasn't informed about the agreement. Juna Pons, the Congress' president, has demanded that Ecuador's government provide details. What disturbs many Ecuadorians is that the airbase will initially be staffed by eight to 15 Americans; that number could mushroom to 250 if patrol flights increase.
Despite the threat of US decertification in the drug war, Peru has also strongly resisted efforts to establish a US airbase in the country. Meanwhile, Venezuela has rejected US requests that it allow military aircraft to fly through Venezuelan air space without specific authorization. In late July, Drug Czar Barry McCaffrey had the audacity to criticize Venezuela publicly for declining to let the US violate its airspace, warning the country that refusal to accept anti-drug planes could turn its skies into a haven for drug smuggling.
In the end, it's the Panama Canal that the US really wants, and
the failed war on drugs
that's providing the pretext to
regain it. In June, General Charles Wilhelm, head of the US Southern
Command, made a startling admission before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. The Pentagon was drawing up contingency plans to
intervene in Panama—if necessary, he said, in order to protect
the security of the canal. The reason? Panama's security forces,
which replaced the country's armed forces after the 1989 invasion
of Panama, are undermanned and underequipped to deal with the
growing threats from Colombia guerrilla incursions and drug
traffickers.
The general neglected to mention that the US disbanded the Panamanian
army in 1989 after its invasion to kidnap Manuel Noriega, replacing it
with the much weaker Panamanian Public Forces. Wilhelm did say that
the plans would either be implemented cooperatively with the
Panamanians, or unilaterally if the conditions dictate.
Although the increasingly powerful Colombian guerrillas have crossed
into Panama on raids for food, supplies, or some R & R, the US
hasn't adequately explained how they threaten the stability of the
canal, nor asked Panama if it would like help in protecting its
borders. Never have the US military forces been here to guard our
borders,
foreign minister Jorge Ritter told a news conference in
June. And they have even less to do with the security of
Panama. Nor do they have anything to do with the security of the
canal.
Nevertheless, in September, the US will reportedly put pressure on
newly elected President Morosco to work out what General Wilhelm
described as cooperative security arrangements.
A June 7 report
from the web site of the publication El Panama America claims that the
US is also pressuring Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Brazil for
permission to deploy military forces and equipment along their borders
to stop the advance of Colombia's guerrilla groups.
A June report by El Espectador, Colombia's second largest
newspaper, indicates that the US anti-drug plan
would include
the formation of a multilateral military force—under US
direction, of course. The proposal has already been presented at a
meeting of the Organization of American States. Most Latin American
countries, including Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and
Venezuela, oppose it.
These initiatives, drawing the US deeper into the internal affairs of its Caribbean and Latin America neighbors, without any real debate in Congress, should concern all Americans. The government appears willing to repeat history, once again using the big stick approach in dealing with the region. Such a development will certainly require a major commitment of military forces, resources, and money.
The desire to maintain an imperial presence in the Caribbean and Latin America remains strong, currently fueled by a failed War on Drugs that exerts a devastating influence on the US domestic and foreign policy. The drug trade continues to expand, while the US anti-drug policy, which stresses interdiction, shows little ability to contain it.
Rather than freezing relations with other Latin American countries by
violating their national security, what's needed is a bit of
self-analysis, the frank review of policies and conduct in the long US
war on drugs.
The conclusion looks obvious: It's time to
end this failed crusade to stamp out the drug trade with military
might.