Date: Mon, 6 Jul 98 22:58:21 CDT
From: Mark Graffis <ab758@virgin.usvi.net>
Subject: How the USIA went from Cold War propagandist to corporate pitchman
Article: 38489
To: undisclosed-recipients:;
Message-ID: <bulk.1553.19980707061550@chumbly.math.missouri.edu>
The headquarters of the US Information Agency (USIA) are just two
blocks from the Mall in Washington, DC. But this government agency,
which receives about $1 billion a year from US taxpayers, is no
tourist attraction. In fact, a US citizen is better off going abroad
to learn how it implements its motto: telling America's story
to the world.
A crucial part of the US foreign policy apparatus, USIA likes to call
its particular branch of foreign affairs public diplomacy,
a
euphemism for propaganda. The encyclopedia definition of the latter
term is instruments of psychological warfare aimed at influencing
the actions of human beings in ways that are compatible with the
national interest objectives of the purveying state.
But USIA
prefers the euphemism, because it doesn't want the US public to think
that its government actively engages in psychological warfare
activities, and because, among the general public, propaganda
is a pejorative catch-all for negative and offensive manipulation.
Nevertheless, I think it aptly describes the operations of the USIA.
How else would you define what is essentially a public relations
instrument of corporate propaganda which sells
the US story
abroad by integrating business interests with cultural objectives? And
I offer this critique as one who experienced the corporate domination
of the USIA firsthand. From 1992-94, I participated in a federal
program for graduate students called the Presidential Management
Intern (PMI) program. As a result, I worked in USIA's Bureau of
Educational and Cultural Affairs (the E Bureau
in
government-speak), whose purpose is to conduct cultural programs which
increase mutual understanding between the people of the US and other
countries. While there, I acted as the agency's contact for the
Fulbright program in Germany, Spain, and the former Yugoslavia. A
Fulbright recipient myself, I very much believed in the ideals of
educational exchange.
But Sen. Fulbright, who wrote in The Price of Empire that
intercultural education could help people find in themselves the
ways and means of living together in peace,
opposed the housing of
his namesake program in the USIA. Not thrilled about the agency s
existence, he even supported a 1987 plan to dismantle it, making the
Smithsonian Institution home for the Fulbright program and returning
public affairs to the State Department. Instead, however, the USIA
undertook a new post-Cold War propaganda emphasis on democracy and
free markets under the Clinton administration. Educational exchange
programs quickly became useful tools to promote the US economic model
and global integration.
The primary targets of USIA propaganda are overseas elite clients from
the upper class business and professional echelon who look to the US
as the world's leader. Often participating in sponsored visits
like the International Visitor Program, they re the 10 to 20 percent
of the target population with relatively high education and influence
potential. The agency prefers this group, despite some anti-US
sentiments, because propaganda is thought to be most effective when
used on powerful influence peddlers. As Noam Chomsky explains, By
and large, they re part of the privileged elite, and share the
interests and perceptions of those in power.
USIA also uses various media, including overseas radio broadcasts like
the Voice of America (VOA), and its
TV counterpart Worldnet, to further influence society's insiders.
What about the other 80 to 90 percent, whom journalist Walter Lippmann
labeled the bewildered herd
? They aren t expected to pay much
attention. Instead, they re the target audience of the commercial mass
media.
Throughout the Cold War, USIA used Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty to reach Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Both received credit for helping win that war. In the 1980s, the Reagan administration created Radio/TV Marti to undermine Fidel Castro's government in Cuba and win support from anti-Castro Cubans in Florida. This was the first triumph of the Cuban American National Foundation, a brainchild of Richard Allen, Reagan's first national security advisor. Allen envisioned an organization for anti-Communist exiles that would be for Cuba what the American-Israel Political Action Committee (AIPAC) was for Israel.
Today, USIA's Office of Cuba Broadcasting is stacked with
supporters of the Cuban-American National Foundation (CANF), whose
controversial founder, the late Jorge Mas Canosa, chaired that
office's Advisory Board. Canosa used his bullying charisma and
organization's clout to secure millions for Radio/TV Marti,
despite internal reports that TV Marti achieves virtually no
reception or impact within the greater Havana area due to heavy
jamming.
The agency's newest broadcasting arm is Radio Free Asia (RFA).
Patterned after Radio Free Europe, RFA began broadcasting to China in
September 1996, and now airs programs for North Korea, Tibet, Vietnam,
Laos, and Burma. The stated mission is to broadcast truthful
information to countries where governments censor information and ban
freedom of the press. Yet, congressional debate over the new venture
was contentious. Opponents argued that the VOA was already
broadcasting effectively to the same countries. RFA proponents then
explained that its broadcasts would be entirely in the native language
of targeted countries, and that the goal of its journalists and
information specialists
would be to destabilize government
control. In other words, RFA would function primarily as a propaganda
operation.
For decades, the messianic mission of the USIA was to counter Soviet propaganda and win the battle for people's minds. Since winning that psychological war, however, the agency has adopted new foreign policy objectives—commercial engagement and expanded markets overseas.
The new campaign actually began in the mid-80s with the funding of the
National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the Center for
International Enterprise (CIPE). These followed Reagan's Project
Democracy and Project Truth, which claimed to spread the ideals of
democracy at the height of US military aid to Latin America. In a 1982
address to the British parliament, Reagan called for a new war of
ideas and values, the first sign of a shift from a policy of
containment to advocacy of democracy and free markets. Some
congressional oversight committee members were skeptical, especially
upon hearing that CIA Director William Casey was helping to plan the
initiative. The academic community also weighed in. If the United
States wants to propagate democracy,
said Harvard professor
Stanley Hoffman, it should do it by example.
Hampshire College
President Adele Simmons called the tone of the project culturally
imperialistic.
Since the passage of NAFTA in 1993, USIA has embraced trade and
economics as its primary mission. At the start of the Clinton
administration, national security advisor Anthony Lake announced the
new rationale: Throughout the Cold War, we contained a global
threat to market democracies. Now we should seek to enlarge their
reach, particularly in places of special significance to us. The
successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of
enlargement, the enlargement of the world's free community of
market democracies.
This Clinton Doctrine places US competitiveness and integration of the
world economy at the heart of foreign policy. In the post-Soviet
environment, that message has become the USIA's raison d tre. As
then-Senator Howell Heflin asserted in a 1996 editorial, the
agency's programs not only serve US national interests, but also
provide direct economic benefits and foster a climate where
American business can develop overseas markets.
If there ever was a White Paper on the intersection of diplomacy with
US business interests, it appeared in News and Views, a publication of
the USIA's American Federation of Government Employees, Local
1812. In the May 1994 issue, distributed to USIA employees worldwide,
the E Bureau's Rhonda Boris announced a restructuring of the
agency's mission. The conversion of 150 bi-national centers and
132 USIA American Centers overseas would activate the link between
US public diplomacy and trade promotion and support the new US foreign
policy of penetrating the Department of Commerce-designated Big
Emerging Markets .
USIA was developing a new synergy between
public diplomacy and trade promotion in the information age,
which
has the potential to become the growth industry for USIA.
Along with hundreds of supporting VOA editorials, this article verified that henceforth, first and foremost, the agency would act to promote US business interests overseas. Of course, USIA's emergence as a mini-Commerce Department makes for duplication of government services in a post-big government era of downsizing. But USIA aims to further synergize the public/private partnership between corporate US and foreign affairs. The agency's Strategic Plan for 1997-2003 includes national security, democracy, law enforcement, and economic prosperity as vital goals. This leads to functions such as promoting NATO expansion (expected to create a boom market for US arms manufacturers), anti-crime and anti-terrorism information programs in cooperation with the Department of Justice and FBI, collaboration with the Drug Enforcement Administration on public affairs programming, and protection of intellectual property rights.
USIA uses national security
and democracy
interchangeably with free enterprise
and the free
market.
Economic prosperity means you have to expand exports,
open markets, assist American business, and foster sustainable
economic growth.
In this context, democracy
isn t a
political system in which citizens participate in the management of
their own affairs. Instead, it means a system in which transnational
business interests and their government allies make decisions that
ensure private profit and massive public subsidies. Economic
prosperity is narrowly defined as that condition in which corporations
can function free of regulation, while relying on government
intervention in the form of tax breaks and corporate welfare.
Under the new mandate, international exchange and public diplomacy are tools to promote free trade, US competitiveness, and US-led democracy building. That's the new hard sell of the US storyteller.
In 1992, candidate Clinton ran with the theme of putting people
first.
He challenged the Cold War legacy of Reagan and Bush and
spoke of an opportunity to shift focus from national security,
containment, and foreign affairs to domestic programs like health care
and education that would benefit all. Less than a year later, however,
President Clinton had a new campaign: putting markets first. As chief
international affairs correspondent for the New York Times, Thomas
Friedman explained: America's victory in the cold war was a
victory for a set of political and economic principles: democracy and
the free market. The free market is the wave of the future—a
future for which America is both the gatekeeper and model.
The
first success of this new policy was the passage of NAFTA and the
creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which included a
Bill of Economic Rights
for corporations.
USIA is scheduled to be incorporated into a reinvented
State
Department by October 1999. USIA's information programs will be
integrated with State's public affairs operation, a new bureau
will handle cultural and exchange issues, and a new assistant
secretary of public diplomacy will ease the transition. The move
suggests business-as-usual. As outlined by Nancy Soderberg, foreign
policy advisor to the National Security Council, economic
prosperity
remains one of the main priorities as the
administration develops a new global trading system with America at
its hub.
For USIA, the new strategy emphasizes public-private partnership -
government doublespeak for private domination and public acquiescence
in budget-cutting times. It means a full partnership between
trade/economic and information/cultural policy. As pressure increases
to measure performance, a good
USIA program becomes one that
meets the corporate bottom line: Does it expand US markets, promote
competitiveness, or link US businesses with overseas counterparts?
Mutual understanding is a straw man; in reality, the US—coached
by business—informs and influences while other countries listen.
Current policymaking reduces the role of citizens to mere
spectators. USIA's model of democracy and the free market is the
superpower version of economic globalization. In this version, capital
flows freely, but the movement of people, particularly the world's
poor, is strictly monitored and controlled. Such a commercial package
speaks first and foremost for government partners,
the
corporations bankrolling and benefiting from the US political
process. But this packaged story, ready for shipment to clients around
the world, is incomplete and undemocratic. Where do workers and
communities fit in? How do private citizens help build dialogue across
cultures?
There is strong evidence that the USIA is an ineffective, obsolete agency that should be dismantled. It has no legitimate post-Cold War function and primarily serves the interest of US trade and economic sectors by touting the superiority of US commercial values and economic policies to elite foreign audiences. Likewise, by overplaying foreign economic concerns, it neglects its second mandate—mutual understanding.
But arguing for abolition puts one in unusual company. The Cato
Institute, a conservative think tank, argues that the USIA is a cold
war relic that can t compete with the US commercial culture sector in
opening up markets. Thus, it supports the proposed merger as a way to
streamline US foreign policy, so that more of the business
of
international relations can be handled by private industry. It appears
that the days of government-sponsored information, culture, and
exchange programs are numbered, a development that could provide an
opening for a democratic alternative that challenges the market
democracy supported by foreign policy.
In A Nation of Salesmen, Earl Shorris describes the US in the late
20th century as completely dominated by selling and a market-driven
version of democracy. An alternative—political
democracy—is a relation among human beings who control
themselves. Market democracy is a competition in which people try to
control each other. The people who do the controlling are called
salesmen. They are rewarded according to their ability to use
information to influence people to do one thing instead of another, an
act they celebrate as the workings of the free market.
These forms
are not interchangeable, and one is a misnomer, for the control of
one human being by another, no matter how subtle the means, is no
democracy.
Personally, I favor political democracy and a foreign policy driven by
informed citizens. USIA's function is to sell
one,
essentially corporate, version of the country to the influential
markets of the world. But countless citizens, working with their
counterparts abroad, are using their united vision to promote
another—a global civic society which promotes the birth of a
one-world community (not market) where diverse cultures can work
together to combat poverty, oppression, pollution, and violence. In
contrast to USIA's boardroom-style model, many of these activists
favor more freedom of movement for people and greater regulation of
capital. Such a grassroots globalism isn t driven by classical
economics and devotion to unlimited growth. Instead, it takes into
account people's values, their cultural and natural environments,
and local economies where traditional non-market values like
reciprocity, mutual aid, and self-reliance build community bonds.