Nuclear non-proliferation a delicate business

By Mark Coultan, The Age (Australia), 10 March 2006

IN HIS speech accepting the Nobel peace prize, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei, pointed to a problem with the rules that attempt to limit the spread of nuclear weapons.

“Any country has the right to master these (nuclear) operations for civilian uses. But in doing so, it also masters the most difficult steps in making a nuclear bomb,” he said.

To overcome this, he proposed “setting up a reserve fuel bank, under IAEA control, so that every country will be assured that it will get the fuel needed for its bona fide peaceful nuclear activities. This assurance of supply will remove the incentive and the justification for each country to develop its own fuel cycle.”

Dr ElBaradei has walked an independent line on the issue of Iraq's (non-existent) weapons of mass destruction, and Iran's pursuit of nuclear technology.

Washington has accused him of not being tough enough on rogue states, and last year lobbied to replace him.

This week, the Iranians attacked his report to the Security Council detailing their failures to comply with the IAEA's requests.

Iran insists its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes only. The US, and many others, don't believe it, pointing to Iran's abundant non-nuclear energy supplies, and the 20 years it has spent working secretly on its nuclear program. It has accused Iran of lying to, and concealing material from, the IAEA.

For months the US has demanded that Iran be brought before United Nations Security Council for breaching the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. But US President George Bush then undermines that treaty by supplying nuclear technology to India, a country that has refused to sign it.

The NPT has, for the past 36 years, been the main instrument limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. The deal, negotiated during the 1960s Cold War, was that the five declared nuclear-armed states the US, the then Soviet Union, France, Britain and China would disarm their nuclear weapons if other nations agreed not to acquire them. Those pursuing nuclear-powered electricity generation did so under safeguards developed by the IAEA.

But many countries opposed the treaty. India never signed it, saying it served only to preserve the world power balance. Nor did Pakistan, India's neighbour and rival. Both countries have tested nuclear weapons. Israel, a non-declared nuclear power, is not a signatory.

But for the most part, and despite little or no efforts by the five big powers to reduce their nuclear armoury, the treaty stuck. There were even some successes. South Africa gave up a nuclear program, as did Libya.

IN HIS speech accepting the Nobel peace prize, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei, pointed to a problem with the rules that attempt to limit the spread of nuclear weapons.

“Any country has the right to master these (nuclear) operations for civilian uses. But in doing so, it also masters the most difficult steps in making a nuclear bomb,” he said.

To overcome this, he proposed “setting up a reserve fuel bank, under IAEA control, so that every country will be assured that it will get the fuel needed for its bona fide peaceful nuclear activities. This assurance of supply will remove the incentive and the justification for each country to develop its own fuel cycle.”

Dr ElBaradei has walked an independent line on the issue of Iraq's (non-existent) weapons of mass destruction, and Iran's pursuit of nuclear technology.

Washington has accused him of not being tough enough on rogue states, and last year lobbied to replace him.

This week, the Iranians attacked his report to the Security Council detailing their failures to comply with the IAEA's requests.

Iran insists its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes only. The US, and many others, don’t believe it, pointing to Iran's abundant non-nuclear energy supplies, and the 20 years it has spent working secretly on its nuclear program. It has accused Iran of lying to, and concealing material from, the IAEA.

For months the US has demanded that Iran be brought before United Nations Security Council for breaching the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. But US President George Bush then undermines that treaty by supplying nuclear technology to India, a country that has refused to sign it.

The NPT has, for the past 36 years, been the main instrument limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. The deal, negotiated during the 1960s Cold War, was that the five declared nuclear-armed states the US, the then Soviet Union, France, Britain and China would disarm their nuclear weapons if other nations agreed not to acquire them. Those pursuing nuclear-powered electricity generation did so under safeguards developed by the IAEA.

But many countries opposed the treaty. India never signed it, saying it served only to preserve the world power balance. Nor did Pakistan, India's neighbour and rival. Both countries have tested nuclear weapons. Israel, a non-declared nuclear power, is not a signatory.

But for the most part, and despite little or no efforts by the five big powers to reduce their nuclear armoury, the treaty stuck. There were even some successes. South Africa gave up a nuclear program, as did Libya.

The failures include North Korea and Iran, who both signed the treaty. North Korea withdrew from it and then announced it had acquired a nuclear weapon. Iran ran a clandestine nuclear program, which it claims is for peaceful purposes.

The political leverage that can be applied to Iran is limited, and it knows it. As the world's fourth-largest oil producer, Iran has more leverage on the rest of the world than the Security Council has against it.

China and Russia, with strong commercial interests in Iran, both oppose applying sanctions against Iran.

The most likely response is a statement from the president of the Security Council (this month chaired by Argentina) urging Iran to heed IAEA requirements. Months of diplomacy will likely follow.

The likelihood of military action against Iran is remote. The US is already overstretched in Iraq and Afghanistan, President Bush's public support is low, and Americans are war weary. America's case will not be helped by President Bush's recent deal with India. His double standard will not be lost on Arabs.

America's deal with India is a dilemma for Australia, a strong supporter of the NPT and the first country to sign the additional protocol, which provides for increased inspections and safeguards.

Australia, the world's largest exporter of uranium (which is to be used only for electricity generation by those who buy it), plays an important role in the non-proliferation regime, which proscribes the supply of uranium and nuclear technology to those countries that have not signed the NPT.

It is this provision that President Bush has disregarded in his deal with India.

NUTS AND BOLTS OF A TREATY

• The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty aims to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to foster peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to further the goal of achieving general and complete disarmament.
• Establishes a safeguards system under the responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
• Came into effect on March 5, 1970 and was to remain for a 25-year period.
• Signed by the US, Britain, the Soviet Union and 59 other countries.
• The three major signatories agree not to assist states not possessing nuclear explosives in obtaining or producing them.
• More countries later ratified the treaty, including the two other major nuclear powers, France and China, in 1992. It was extended indefinitely in 1995 by a consensus vote of 174 countries at the United Nations.
• May 11, 1995: more than 170 countries extended the treaty indefinitely, without conditions.
• Review conference in April/May 2000, five nuclear weapon states China, France, Russia, Britain and the US pledged their commitment to the ultimate goal of complete nuclear disarmament under effective international controls.
• As of January 2005, the NPT membership stands at 189 states.