From owner-imap@chumbly.math.missouri.edu Tue Jun 15 10:15:11 2004
Date: Mon, 7 Jun 2004 00:38:09 -0500 (CDT)
From: Michel Collon <michel.collon@skynet.be>
Subject: [DU-WATCH] Herman : Genocide
, Milosevic and Nato
Article: 181659
To: undisclosed-recipients: ;
Genocide,Milosevic and Nato
Milosevic was not indicted along with Mladic and Karadzic in 1995 for the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia in prior years, so the belated attempt in The Hague in 2002 to make him responsible for those killings suggests that UN war crimes tribunal chief prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte did this because she saw that the killings in Kosovo fell far short of anything she could pass off as ‘genocide.’
There is now substantial literature that makes a strong case that the Tribunal is not only a crudely political arm of NATO, but that it is a
rogue court.As a political arm, it regularly cleared the ground for NATO military actions and since that victory the Tribunal has worked hard to prove that the NATO war was just.
Liberals and much of the left have been badly bamboozled on recent
Yugoslav history and the role of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, with former Serbian President Slobodan
Milosevic having been hyper-demonized and the history of the Balkans
rewritten to fit what Lenard Cohen calls the paradise
lost/loathsome leaders
paradigm. But numerous serious scholars
have rejected this history and regard the U.S. and other NATO powers
as heavily responsible for the disasters since 1990. Lord David
Owen's Balkan Odyssey, and his testimony before the Tribunal, make
it very clear that Milosevic was eager for a settlement of the Bosnian
wars well before the Dayton agreement in 1995, and that he regularly
had major conflicts of interest with the Bosnian Serbs. It is clear
from Owens, as well as from other experts that the U.S. government
played a key role in the failure of the 1991 Vance plan, the 1992
Cutileiro plan, and the 1993-94 Vance-Owen and Owen Stoltenberg plans,
as the Clinton administration armed the Bosnian Muslims, and later the
KLA in Kosovo, while encouraging them both to hope (and work) for
U.S.-NATO military intervention on their behalf.
Milosevic was not indicted along with Mladic and Karadzic in 1995 for
the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia in prior years, so the belated attempt
in The Hague in 2002 to make him responsible for those killings
suggests that UN war crimes tribunal chief prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte
did this because she saw that the killings in Kosovo fell far short of
anything she could pass off as genocide.
Even establishment
spokespersons like retired U.S. Air Force General Charles Boyd and UN
official Cedric Thornberry have stressed that the Bosnian killings in
the years 1991-1995 were by no means confined to those by Bosnian
Serbs: the Croatians and Bosnian Muslims, the latter supplemented by
thousands of imported mujahideen, slaughtered many thousands of their
ethnic enemies in the area. But the Tribunal, organized, funded, and
essentially controlled by the U.S. and Britain, was only interested in
pursuing NATO targets, and these were almost exclusively Serbs.
There is now substantial literature that makes a strong case that the
Tribunal is not only a crudely political arm of NATO, but that it is a
rogue court.
As a political arm, it regularly cleared the
ground for NATO military actions and since that victory the Tribunal
has worked hard to prove that the NATO war was just.
The Milosevic trial is the main vehicle for proving NATO's virtue,
though it has been a major flop in proving its case and maintaining an
image of fairness and justice. The latter problem was nicely
illustrated in the Tribunal's recent privileged treatment of the
U.S. government and Wesley Clark. Thus, the U.S. government was given
the right to demand a closed session of the court and to redact
testimony; Clark was allowed to communicate with outsiders and obtain
and insert into the record a truth testimonial from Bill Clinton, in
straightforward violation of Judge May's trial rules. Readers of
the New York Times (or In These Times and The Nation) will also never
know that with William Walker on the stand, Judge May's deference
to the Ambassador
was laughable: during direct examination by
the prosecutors there was not one interruption, while during
Milosevic's cross-examination he interrupted 70 times, and
wouldn't allow him to ask Walker, the man who grieved so over
deaths at Racak, about his earlier crude apologetics for the killing
of the six Jesuit leaders and others in El Salvador.
A recent example of the kind of analysis that repeats the canards
common to the liberal conventional wisdom
is FPIF's
commentary by Stacy Sullivan, of the Institute for War and Peace
Reporting (IWPR), on Milosevic and Genocide: Has the Prosecution
Made Its Case?
(http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2004/0402milosevic.html). IWPR is
funded by the State Department, USAID, the National Endowment for
Democracy, the Open Society Institute, and half a dozen other Western
governments, and it has long served as a de facto propaganda arm of
NATO. Sullivan is most noted for her New Republic classic of hardline
pro-war and vengeance propaganda, Milosevic's Willing
Executioners
(May 9, 1999). Sullivan's FPIF article is in the
same mode, taking it as a given that the Tribunal is an apolitical
instrument of justice and that we have an honest and not a show trial.
Her first sentence says that the prosecutors announced right off that
they would prove
Milosevic guilty of genocide. She fails to
mention that the Bosnia charges were added belatedly, that Milosevic
had not been charged with them at the time of the actual killings, and
that while Del Ponte said she would prove
this guilt she
admittedly didn't yet have the evidence. Indict, publicly and
flamboyantly charge, and then look for the evidence, has long been the
Tribunal's modus operandi.
Sullivan's second sentence mentions that there were 300
witnesses,
some high level insiders who have turned on their
former master,
thousands of pages of documents,
etc. We are
supposed to be impressed with this sheer volume of smoke that must
show a genocidal fire. She doesn't mention that Canadian law
professor Michael Mandel gave Del Ponte thousands of pages
of
documents in April 1999 showing NATO war crimes, which of course Del
Ponte ignored, and that thousands of pages have been published and
innumerable witnesses could have been supplied as witnesses for the
many thousands of Serb victims in Bosnia. It is extremely easy to find
victimized people in civil wars who will testify to maltreatment if
given the opportunity and even paid for their trouble, and some and
perhaps most will even be telling the painful truth. But only a
propagandist will mention the 300 witnesses as if this alone is a
serious consideration in proving genocide.
As regards the high level insiders,
in fact the prosecution
came up with few that were high level and fewer still who were
cooperative. One of their prime witnesses, Ratomir Tanic, appears to
have been a conman, who was so inside
that he couldn't even
describe the location of the president's office. Genuine insiders
like former Yugoslav president Zoran Lilic and member of the Yugoslav
presidency Borislav Jovic confirmed Milosevic on almost all key
points. Rade Markovic, the former head of Yugoslav security, who had
everything to gain from denouncing his old boss, also defended
Milosevic on all key points while renouncing a statement he claimed
had been extracted from him by threats and torture during a 17 month
stint in prison. Sullivan predictably doesn't mention that many
insiders
and others were bribed and threatened with heavy
sentences unless they acquiesced to plea-bargains.
Sullivan claims that many legal experts are doubtful about a
successful genocide charge because the Tribunal has set the bar for
doing so extremely high.
They might have to prove that Milosevic
orchestrated the breakup of Yugoslavia with the specific intent to
destroy Bosnian Muslims as a people...[with] unequivocal evidence of
genocidal intent...calling for the liquidation of all of the Bosnian
Muslims...
The idea that Milosevic wanted the breakup of
Yugoslavia is ideology run wild and contradicts the usual formula that
he attacked Slovenia and Croatia in an attempt to prevent their exit
from Yugoslavia (for a summary of an alternative view of the Balkan
wars, see Edward S. Herman, Diana Johnstone on the Balkan Wars,
http://www.monthlyreview.org/0203herman.htm, as well as a recent piece
by George Szamuely for FPIF, The Yugoslavian Fairytale,
http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2004/0405fairytale.html).
As there was a lot of back-and-forth ethnic cleansing and killing in
Bosnia, and the celebrated Srebrenica killings were comprised entirely
of military-aged men, many killed in fighting, and after the Bosnian
Serbs had admittedly separated out the women and children and moved
them to safe refuge, intent and plan (as well as the still elusive
Milosevic control of the Bosnian Serb forces) would seem rather
essential to proving that Milosevic was guilty of genocide in any
sense. Besides, Del Ponte said she was definitely going to
prove
genocide. What concept did she have in mind?
Sullivan doesn't have a clue on the level of Tribunal bars
for charges of genocide. These have proved to be wonderfully flexible,
and her claim of a too-high bar has no basis in any Tribunal actions
but is rather a form of pressure to get the bar low enough to assure
the show trial's proper result. In Bosnian Serb General
Krstic's case, the Tribunal found Krstic guilty of genocide by
making it virtually the same thing as ethnic cleansing, and extending
the concept to killing only armed men in a single small town!
Assuming that this was a valid case of genocide, Sullivan alleges that
an acquittal would have serious consequences for attempts to
prosecute genocide in the future.
If it isn't a valid case of
genocide it wouldn't interfere with future efforts at
all. However, if it is a corrupt case brought by an alliance that
actually carried out the supreme crime
of aggression in
violation of the UN Charter in attacking Yugoslavia, using the
Tribunal first as a war-facilitating instrument and then as a means of
justifying the aggression, losing the case would be a plus for the
international rule of law. This is not likely to happen, given the
fact that the Tribunal is an arm of the NATO powers, although the case
made by the prosecution has been so weak that it is not inconceivable
that Milosevic might only be found guilty of crimes against
humanity.
What might really interfere with efforts to pursue genocide would be
if the United States or another major power engaged in genocide or
gave it support, as there are no mechanisms to prevent or punish acts
such as these in the New World Order, and major powers are essentially
exempt. Thus, the sanctions of mass destruction
imposed by the
U.S. and Britain on Iraq from 1991-2002 killed four or five times as
many civilians as died from all causes in the Balkans wars of the
1990s, and as Thomas Nagy and Joy Gordon have shown, these deaths were
brought about deliberately; and Suharto's and his successors'
operations in Indonesia and East Timor were big-time genocidal, but
under Western, and notably U.S. and British, protection. The problem
of this exemption does not occur to Sullivan.
Sullivan argues that by far the most serious consequences of an
acquittal on genocide charges...would be for Bosnia's victims,
ignoring the Croat and Serbian victims, of which there were many
thousands. (The largest single ethnic cleansing during the Balkan wars
was of Serbs driven out of the Krajina in August 1995, by the Croats,
with U.S. assistance; the largest proportionate ethnic cleansing in
those wars was of Serbs and other minorities, including Roma, driven
out of Kosovo by the KLA under NATO auspices after June 1999.) But
even in her own narrow terms of reference, how concerned are Bosnian
victims over this issue? How does Sullivan know about the victims'
feelings? A poll taken in Bosnia several years ago indicated that no
more than six percent of Bosnian Muslims, Serbs, or Croats considered
the bringing of war criminals to justice as important (Charles Boyd,
Making Bosnia Work,
Foreign Affairs, January 1998).
Furthermore, why would Bosnian victims need a successful
genocide
charge and not be satisfied with guilt for crimes
against humanity?
However, if the function of the trial is to
prove the NATO war just, we must have genocide.
Best, however,
to pretend that it is concern over the victims rather than
NATO-establishment priorities that make the charge of genocide so
important.
Editor: John Gershman, Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC)
Thomas Nagy, The Secret Behind the Sanctions: How the U.S.
Intentionally Destroyed Iraq's Water Supply,
The Progressive,
(September 2001) http://www.progressive.org/0901/nagy0901.html
Joy Gordon, Economic Sanctions as Weapons of Mass Destruction,
Harpers, (November 2002) http://www.harpers.org/CoolWar.html
Contact the IRC's webmaster with inquiries regarding the functionality of this website.
Published by Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF), a joint project of the Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC, online at www.irc-online.org) and the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS, online at www.ips-dc.org). 2004. All rights reserved.
Edward S. Herman, Stacy Sullivan on Milosevic and Genocide,
(Silver City, NM & Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus, May
28, 2004).
Web location:
http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2004/0405ssgenocide.html
See also : Vanessa Stojilkovic & Michel Collon, The Damned of Kosovo, film, 78', 2002.
Available in PAL-Europe at michel.collon@skynet.be Available in NTSC (USA, Canada...) at zoranstar@yahoo.com
See also : Michel Collon, Liars' Poker, New York, 2002 and Monopoly, Nato conquerring the world, New York, june 2004 available at: Milo Yelesiyevich <serbianclassics@hotmail.com>