A universal perspective or general intellectual position

A dialog on the PhilOfHi list, November 2002

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> i wonder if we can think of some general intellectual position on
> our topics? it can be called transnational, transcultural or anyhow

I don’t quite understand Nikolai’s point here, and hope he will elaborate it. For example, there are innumerable cultures in the world. If we study them in particular, we are engaged in short-range historiography; if we distance ourselves from their empirical specificity, we may escape parochialism, but our newly won universal perspective probably ends up being vacuous.

Lefton Stavrianos once argued for a lunar vantage point from which to view the whole of world history. However, what that meant was to give greater weight to places, times and topics that tended to be ignored in traditional historiography. It came down to a subjective choice of our material that is simply less Eurocentric and political. At the time he wrote, the world was dangerously divided, and such a recommendation made good political sense, but I don’t see that it represents any kind of historiographic insight.

Is the central issue here to reconcile empirical specificity with our necessary desire for universality? If someone has some ideas on this, I’d like to hear them.

> such a position should be able to proceed value-neutral and
> interest-neutral discussions, and include in this area intellectual
> theoretical propositions

Same problem as above. Am I to be so open-minded that my brains fall out? How can I reconcile a critical perspective with one that at the same time claims universality? I suspect we need to study more carefully why we must remain empirical and also why we need to strive for universality. If we are to reconcile them, surely we must know why we cling to them.

> as for value and interest issues (which seem to be inevitable in
> social-historical discourse in contrast to, say maths or chemistry),
> i would suggest some general humanism that can be understood as good
> old Kantian values of respect to life, security, self-determination,
> and interest of ALL living (and future) rational beings,

Some kind of existential a-priori? I’ve no doubt a case could be made for it, but I’m not sure it would be generally persuasive.

> at the same time i argue that our very identity as intellectuals
> (those who produce decontextualized ideas—R.Collins,1998)
> implicitly presuppose smth like this position, and my point here is
> simply to uncover this presupposition and appeal to think of it at
> least as of some ideal in further discussions

The word intellectuals leaves me uncomfortable. I understand that intelligentsia has been a useful category, and if it only refers to people who make their living with ideas or people who are attracted to the world of ideas, I suppose it is harmless enough. But here it is associated with decontextualized ideas, which strikes me a horribly ideological and unscientific (alien to statements that might claim truth value). Does not an exploration of the axioms of decontextualized ideas have metaphysics as its own presupposition? Again, I’m all for introspection, but if truth can be detached from empiria, such an assumption requires defense. The problem is that the defense or criticism must itself presume the existence or non-existence of metaphysics.

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The key word in the subject line is general. Off hand, it might refer to three quite different things:

a) To what is de-contextualized, is separated from empiria, and yet real; a mental representation of that metaphysical reality;

b) To what is a generalization of empiria—the creation of mental categories based on a hypostatization of those empirical qualities that happen to persist because doing so is useful in daily life;

c) To what presumes a real connection between the whole (the empirical-universal) and its parts (empirical particulars).

For what reason would one insist on the existence of a metaphysic (truth detached from empiria, which I’m personally inclined to label superstition)? Or must all truth for some reason remain empirical? If so, how then does it achieve universality by escaping the particular constraints of daily life? My own answer is process, but no one seems inclined to follow me in that line of argument.

Haines KB1GRM

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> For what reason would one insist on the existence of a metaphysic
> (truth detached from empiria, which I’m personally inclined to label
> superstition)? Or must all truth for some reason remain empirical?
> If so, how then does it achieve universality by escaping the
> particular constraints of daily life? My own answer is process, but
> no one seems inclined to follow me in that line of argument.

hello Haines. i was going to respond to your deconstruction post but lost all my e-mail, so i’ve forgotten your specific questioning. yet the above inquiry into reasoning has me greatly intrigued, so i’ll offer one potential understanding:

to me it seems that metaphysics may be tied into a type of abstract understanding or knowledge, which may or may not be able to be translated into the tangible, or may feed off of the tangible and go beyond what is directly experienced. whereas, when more information may arise about a specific event which the metaphysical knowledge may be organized around, so too may peoples understanding change, and the metaphysics may become more purely so, or more irrelevant.

metaphysics, to me, could be somewhat equated with religious beliefs, and in particular one might argue that the Greeks and Romans who believed in Thor and Zeus may have engaged in a middle-ground between metaphysical and empirical knowledge.

then, these gods controlled or represented amongst other things, lightning. while the gods of this lightning power sat in the mantle of the sky, it took thousands of years later for Ben Franklin to connect the dots between lightning and an electrified atmosphere, empirical knowledge that may have been suspended throughout the time preceding the more exact/tangible knowledge, much later.

in this sense, it seems that metaphysics precedes empiricism at times, and yet is still relevant afterwords, in a changed, or recontextualized, understanding. for instance, oftentimes myths can be referred to once their all-encompassing meta- physical status has been somewhat neutralized, so that they can co-exist with empirical knowledge. notice how many myths are referred to during major/epochal events when people try to describe what is beyond the specificities of current words/ ideas/understandings, and timeframes, to one that will likely continue after as much as before, as metaphysical awareness.

in my view, the problem with metaphysical knowledge is in its inability to address issues of empirical knowledge, in common and not special terms. and, much teaching today rests on this type of thinking, where one has to believe something is true, rather than being able to empirically discern or experience or know and share such a truth between oneself and many others in a secular environment.

in all, say with internet-hysteria in trying to conceive and understand such an abstraction, it is very useful to have a wide-range of viewpoints, metaphysical and empirical, working on the issues, doing what each can uniquely do, and where they do intertwine, to benefit from that richness. yet, there is a time when the metaphysical truth wears off, as the context has changed, and it is time for a philosophy that people can reason independently and yet find commonalities that may otherwise not arise, beyond questions of faith and belief. this is where, it seems, empirical understanding (with metaphysical understanding, but made tangible) can become primary.

and, in a sense, i think by limiting the realm of metaphysics, the metaphysical reality maintains its core integrity, in a certain venue, and empiricism its own unique realm too. these issues may be overlapping somewhat with the Sokal Hoax and now, possibly, the supposedly new Hoax in quantum physics, where the realm between fiction and fact intermix the ingredients.

bc

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BC,

You take off from my rather problematic statement to arrive at some sensible comments about the importance of myth. Let me see if I can summarize your position, and then suggest that my original point may have been more destructive than you realized. First, my attempt to summarize your point.

> to me it seems that metaphysics may be tied into a type of
> abstract understanding or knowledge, which may or may not be able
> to be translated into the tangible,

I’m not sure if I’d equate understanding (Verstehen?) with knowledge, so will stick with the latter, which I take to mean statements that can be said to have truth value. Now I think it follows that metaphysics would be knowledge that has a different criterion of truth than empirically-based knowledge, although it is possibly, but not necessarily, related to empirical knowledge.

> metaphysics, to me, could be somewhat equated with religious
> beliefs, and in particular one might argue that the Greeks and
> Romans who believed in Thor and Zeus may have engaged in a
> middle-ground between metaphysical and empirical knowledge.

So far this remains ambivalent. I think religious beliefs might be a good example of a truth that is not empirically-based, but the reference to ancient gods seems to muddy the waters. The ancient West (because it was a slave-based society) assumed a contradictory relation between the Absolute and the contingent. This assumption was so troublesome that they occasionally cooked up a demi-urgos that shared both categories, despite the logical impossibility. I take the contradictory truth of the demi-urgos to be your point about myth.

> in my view, the problem with metaphysical knowledge is in its
> inability to address issues of empirical knowledge, in common and
> not special terms.

Yes, that’s implied by the initial axioms. My only point here is that the categories may be peculiarly Western (actually, I’d include ancient Hindustan as well, because it, too, was a slave society, but that’s another issue) and so perhaps positing a metaphysics is ideological—is a product of Western culture that is hegemonic in today’s world.

> this type of thinking, where one has to believe something is true,
> rather than being able to empirically discern or experience or
> know and share such a truth between oneself and many others in a
> secular environment.

I’m not sure it is your intent, but it seems that metaphysical truth is not communicable except among people who share the same circumstances (such as my example of slave society above) or if one presumes an Absolute that is personal (a link between the contingent individual and the Absolute) that leads people to similar conclusions (i.e., revelation). I’m not sure if your reference to problem above means that it is truth that can’t be tested empirically. But I gather most religionists would insist that the validation does not come from empirical evidence, but is existential or supernatural in origin.

> there is a time when the metaphysical truth wears off, as the
> context has changed, and it is time for a philosophy that people
> can reason independently and yet find commonalities that may
> otherwise not arise, beyond questions of faith and belief. this is
> where, it seems, empirical understanding (with metaphysical
> understanding, but made tangible) can become primary.

Yes, I think I agree with you here. That is, if metaphysical truth is something profoundly private, what can be said about it? In a forum such as this, we try to communicate and develop truths that are necessarily empirically-based and inter-personal, and so metaphysics must remain irrelevant.

But now that I’ve tried to characterize your position, let me put in my two-cents worth in relation to it. I had originally said:

> > For what reason would one insist on the existence of a metaphysic
> > (truth detached from empiria, which I’m personally inclined to
> > label superstition)? Or must all truth for some reason remain
> > empirical? If so, how then does it achieve universality by
< > > escaping the particular constraints of daily life? My own answer
> > is process, but no one seems inclined to follow me in that line
> > of argument.

My point was actually not based on the distinction between empirical (the contingent) and metaphysics (the Absolute), but to suggest that empirical facts are themselves probably metaphysical and therefore subject to the criticisms I believe you have raised.

First of all, all empirical evidence is present evidence. We may infer from it some truth about a world that once did exist, but exists no more. Since facts represent truthful knowledge based on empirical evidence, all facts exist only in the present. What we say about the past is not a fact, but interpretation. Yes, this is an old point, but I just wanted to make sure that when we discuss facts, we are talking about the present.

The fact is inferred from empirical observation. The problem is that the result of observation is static, while the empiria upon which it is based is continually changing. What is observed is becoming; the fruit of observation is being. Everything is actually a process (a point not difficult to prove), but an observation kills it in order to extract from it a static value. I think of this as a kind of Heisenberg principle of historiography. You build static truths by having your observation of a fluid process (or a series of static observations like the frames of a movie film) support a statement of static fact.

In short, the construction of a fact from an observation of a fluid process gives rise to the same contradiction you commented upon. It is a truth that in this case arises from empiria, but is not reducible to it, and so it becomes metaphysical. That is, the historian’s fact, if taken to be meaningful in itself, really amounts to a religious revelation.

I don’t here intend to resolve this contradiction beyond hinting that a resolution is possible. Scientific realism suggests that we start with what we know to be true and then build mental categories sufficient to represent it in thought. We know everything is fluid, and so we need conceptual categories that are based on process rather than static facts. I would argue this means we define things as essentially consisting not only of an empirical dimension, but also of a necessary causal relation with the environment—to all else. That is, all things would have two contradictory dimensions: the abstract (what joins things) and the empirical (what distinguishes things). These would be the dimensions of how we represent facts in thought. Specifically, a causal relation would have to be a priori, not a posteriori (this not as difficult as it might at first seem).

Is it possible to represent things in our mind as processes, but I won’t pursue the point here, for I don’t think there would be much sympathy or interest in it. My conclusion is then simply that we can’t base knowledge just on static facts, for that would make it trivial and, as I suggested, essentially supernatural.

Probably most historians want to achieve a knowledge that transcends the facts, but transcendence can be of two kinds. Transcendence can mean distance from, even separation from, empiria. But, as BC shows, this takes us into the realm of superstition. However, I’d argue that transcendence can instead mean defining the fact in such a way that it implies (includes) the universal (Arthur Koestler’s holon). Indeed, this is how one might represent the fact as a process in the first place, by seeing things as essentially connected. So the transcendent knowledge that we seek might not be achieved by a separation from empiria, but from placing observations in the context of the whole, to see the whole in its part. That is, we escape empirical trivia, not by downplaying the empirical, but by broadening our insistence upon it to include everything.

Haines Brown

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Thank you Haines

i see now that i really was misunderstood and try to make my point more clear

On 14 Nov 02 Haines Brown <brownh@hartford-hwp.com> wrote:

> nikolai: i wonder if we can think of some general intellectual position on
> > our topics? it can be called transnational, transcultural or anyhow
>
> haines: I don’t quite understand Nikolai’s point here, and hope he will
> elaborate it a bit. For example, there are innumerable cultures in the
> world. If we study them in particular, we are engaged in short-range
> historiography; if we distance ourselves from their empirical
> specificity, we may escape parochialism, but our newly won universal
> perspective probably ends up being vacuous.

not at all, in any science attention to diversities and attempts to grasp empirical specifics lead not to smth vacuous but to more abstract and potentially more rich conceptual apparatus (take biology, mineralogy, sociology or anthropology)

> Lefton Stavrianos once argued for a lunar vantage point from which
> to view the whole of world history. However, what that meant in
> practice was to give greater weight to places, times and topics that
> tended to be ignored in traditional historiography. It came down to a
> subjective choice of our material that is simply less Eurocentric and
> political. At the time he wrote, the world was dangerously divided,
> and such a recommendation made good political sense, but I don’t see
> that it represents any kind of historiographic insight.

i agree, but i mean not mere equality of volume or attention in historiography, but rather rationality and reflexiveness of intellectual position; i.e. a rule to make explicit and to justify criteria of more or less attention to any subject

> Is the central issue here now to reconcile empirical specificity with
> our necessary desire for universality? If someone has some ideas on
> this, I’d like to hear them.

see above, moreover the very contradiction seems to me false, one can really grasp ’empirical specificity’ only on the basis of comparisons and corresponding universal concepts

> > as for value and interest issues (which seem to be inevitable in
> > social-historical discourse in contrast to, say maths or chemistry),
> > i would suggest some general humanism that can be understood as good
> > old Kantian values of respect to life, security, self-determination,
> > and interest of ALL living (and future) rational beings,
>
> Some kind of existential a-priori? I’ve no doubt a case could be made
> for it, but I’m not sure it would be generally persuasive.

no, rather some moral apriori if you like,

apriori respect to life and dignity of any human being on the Earth, why not?

> > at the same time i argue that our very identity as intellectuals
> > (those who produce decontextualized ideas — R.Collins,1998)
> > implicitly presuppose smth like this position, and my point here is
> > simply to uncover this presupposition and appeal to think of it at
> > least as of some ideal in further discussions
>
> The word intellectuals leaves me uncomfortable. I understand that
> intelligentsia has been a useful category, and if it only refers to
> people who make their living with ideas or people who are attracted to
> the world of ideas, I suppose it is harmless enough. But here it is
> associated with decontextualized ideas, which strikes me a horribly
> ideological and unscientific (alien to statements that might claim
> truth value). Does not an exploration of the axioms of
> decontextualized ideas have metaphysics as its own presupposition?
> Again, I’m all for introspection, but if truth can be detached from
> empiria, such an assumption requires defense. The problem is that the
> defense or criticism must itself presume the existence or
> non-existence of metaphysics.

the term decontextualized ideas was misunderstood here; there is no question about any axioms or metaphisics; much more simple; we here, f.e. me and Haines are (or behave as) intellectuals just because discuss issues on universality, empiria, criticism, metaphysics, philosophy, history or anything else, and we do it without some definite practical purpose, without gaining any money or power; we may disagree in many points, but we mean that our issues have some autonomous significance in spite of social or other context, i.e. presence or absence any practical use (extra-intellectual) of these ideas.

> The key word in the subject line is general. Off hand, it might
> refer to three quite different things:
>
> a) To what is de-contextualized, is separated from empiria, and yet
> real; a mental representation of that metaphysical reality;
>
> b) To what is a generalization of empiria—the creation of mental
> categories based on a hypostatization of those empirical qualities
> that happen to persist because doing so is useful in daily life;
>
> c) To what presumes a real connection between the whole (the
> empirical-universal) and its parts (empirical particulars).

no, what i mean is (d): general intellectual position as some rational and moral basis shared by intellectuals who belong to various cultures, ideologies and social classes

one can say: nothing can be shared

but my hope is that some respect to thinking itself, to truth, to empirical arguments, to justification, to logic, to theoretical work, to empirical research, to philosophical argumentation etc. can be shared

sure, i do not see any special insight here, just a basis for further discussion which as i hope can be more fruitful than mutual accusation in some specific class, national, political, ideological or any other position

in fact i do not find this thread (initialized by myself) very prospective, we already went far from phil of hi issues, smb can agree or disagree with the idea of general intell. position, it is sufficient that it exists now as some invisible background

turning to more concrete issues, maybe we can discuss modern world politics, first of all in the context of competition between USA, United Europe and East (Japan and rising China), and in more deep context of change of world leaders in history ( a la Braudel, Modelski, etc)?